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ABSTRACT

Recent changes in economic and political organization in the Chinese countryside
are producing a new basis for inquiry into congruence between village leaders and those
who choose them

一 namely，

their electorates of ordinary villagers and selectorates of

leaders at the higher township leve l. This paper draws on 1990 survey data to analyze
the connection between village leaders and their electorates and selectorates , in terms
of congruence of positions along an economic ideology dimension measuring orientations
to the importance of state management relative to private individual initiative in
economic developmen t. Results of multivariate regression ånalyses of congruence in
terms of responsiveness , proximity , and centrism indicate: (1) there is significant
congruence beMeen village leaders and their electorates and selectorates along the
dimension , and

(ρ2
勾) inte
叮r句

electorates results in 討
s 19n1 自 cant par此t from institutions and attitudes associated with e 缸or此ts
前t
a

grassroots democratization .

IDEOLOGICAL CONGRUENCE IN THE CHINESE COUNTRYSIDE:
VILLAGE LEADERS AND THEIR ELECTORATES AND SELECTORATES

Quantitative empirical inquiry into congruence between political leaders and
ordinary citizens has contributed

signi自 cantly

to our knowledge about fundamental

political processes in liberal democracies (see esp. Miller and Stokes 1963 , Achen 1978 ,
Powell 1982, Dalton 1985 , Huber and Po\vell 1994). Such inquiry takes as its point of
departure the following c1 aim: leaders are outcomes of a con1petitive political process
ln日 uenced

in large part by preferences of voters for particular policies. An alysis of

congruence between leaders and citizens evaluates the quality of representation , by
measuring the extent to \vhich the electoral connection in fact produces a policy
connection , usua l1 y as re f1 ected in significant agreenlent be t\veen citizens and elected
leaders (or

gov
閃
vel
臼n叩

sonle Ineasure , leaders in liberal democracies are supposed to be c1 0se to the center of
their constituencies.
Without the theoretical premise of an electoral connection , there seen1S to be
little to motivate analysis of congruence. This is the nlain explanation for the lack of
cOlllparable studies in communist states. Indeed , the key mechanism connecting leaders
and citizens in those states is not designed to transform nlass preferences into public
policy (see Meyer 1957, Lindblom 1977, Dahl 1989).

Put simply , the basic theolY

sustaining the communist c1 aim to legitimate authority presumes communist leadership
is representative in the following sense: communist

par可 members

comprise an

enlightened revolutionary vanguard that alone is able to comprehend and represent the
objective long-term interests of the masses.

Depending on the level of econon1Î c

development and mass revolutionary consciousness , however , those interests nlay not
correspond c1 0sely to some aggregation of preferences of ordinary citizens. Accordingly ,

the guarantee that communist leaders represent nlass interests is not the test of regular
electoral competition , but the

e 旺ective

monopoly of power by a hierarchically organized ,

intemally disciplined , politically correct communist party elite (Lenin 1902, 1904, 1919).
Elections in communist states are not, then , in conception or practice , public
policy contests.

Nor does the

Leninist 台 amework

allo\v electoral challenges to the

leading role of the communist party: elections are organized as fully predictable
plebiscites or limited-choice elections (see Pravda 1978) , in which the range of outcomes
is restricted to candidates vetted and approved by communist party selectorates at higher
levels. Such an arrangenlent suggests congruence between elected leaders and their
selectorates , rather than electorates , but conditions for political survey research in
conlmunist states have generalIy not been conducive to inquiry into congruence of any
sort.
Recent changes in economic and political organization in the Chinese countryside
are producing a new basis for inquiry into congruence be t\veen leaders at the rural
grassroots and those who choose thenl -- namely , their electorates of ordinary villagers
and selectorates of leaders at the higher township leve l. At the same time , improved
circumstances for research have made such an inquiry possible. Th is paper draws on a
unique set of survey data to analyze the connection between village leaders and their
electorates and selectorates , in terms of congruence of positions along an economic
ideology dimension measuring orientations to a basic question of political economy: the
importance of state management relative to private individual initiative in econonlic
development.
Th e data analyzed here
some 仰o

are 台om

a sample of 56 Chinese villages surveyed in 1990 ,

years after passage of a law establishing popularly elected village committees

as autonomous organizations of power in the countryside. Th e analysis of congruence
2

exploits a feature of the data set unique to sU lV ey research on mainland China. Th is is
the combination of a nested sampIing design (permitting a matching of vi lI age leaders
with those who choose them) and the commonality of many questionnaire items to elite
and n1ass inte lViews (permitting a matching of responses to the same items).
sampling design nests vi lI ages within 趴'enty townships and four counties. 1

Th e

Speci且c

analyses of congruence compare self-placement of viIIage leaders with self-placement of
respondents sampled from their respective viIIage electorates and township selectorates ,
along the economic ideology dimension.
1 begin below with a brief summaly of recent changes in rural economic and
political organization and a discussion of their implications for inquiry into congruence
be 趴' een

vi I1 age leaders and those who choose them. An introduction to the economic

ideology din1ension foIIo\vs. The analytical body of the paper consists of multivariate
regression analyses of congruence along the dimension , using as dependent variables
Achen's (1978) measures of congruence in terms of responsiveness , proximity , and
centrism. The first analyses inquire into the existence of substantively and statisticaIIy
significant congruence. Finding

signi 且 cant

congruence between viIIage leaders and their

electorates and selectorates , 1 consider the relationship between congruence and recent
e旺'o rts

at grassroots democratization , focusing on congruence between viIIage leaders and

viIIagers. In these analyses , 1 try to explain inter-viIIage variation in congruence , testing
hypotheses implicit in Chinese accounts of democratization in the vi lI ages.
The Changing Context of Vi lI age Leadership
Agricultural decoIIectivization was one of the earliest and most consequential
changes adopted in the reform period that began in 1978. With the decoIIectivization ,
rural communes and their subordinate production brigades (and teams) were disman t1 ed
and replaced by township governments and vi lI age committees , respectively (see table 1).

3

Land and other production inputs were divided among peasant households t o. manage
on their

own ，台ee

markets were reopened , most obligatory sales to the state were

abolished , and private entrepreneurship was promoted.

[Table 1 about here]

Th e new incentive structure for agricultural production quickly proved successful

by lnost economic standards , but its consequences for leadership at the rural grassroots
were very serious. Decollectivization enorn10usly weakened tbe power of tbe state to
exact cOlnpliance fron1 peasants , the state's hold over village leaders , and the dependence
of villagers on those leaders (see Unger 1989). Peasants continued to rely somewhat on
leaders for favorable allocation of production inputs , marketing opportunities , and other
resources (Oi 1986a , 1986b , 1989) , but the basic terms of the implicit contract changed
once peasant incomes ceased to be a residual of the collective labor produc1.
The 1982 Constitution had introduced autonomous village comn1ittees to manage
the villages , but the official

e 在'o rt

had essentially ended at tha 1. By the mid-1980s , village

leadership had atropbied to a degree that caused concern among policymakers in Beijing.
Village meetings were rarely convened , peasants resisted

e旺'orts

by village leaders to

implement important but unpopular directives (such as family planning) , tensions and
violent con f1 icts between villagers and village leaders bad become common , many village
leaders had abdicated their po.s.i tions of leadership to enrich themselves as specialized
producers or entrepreneurs , and others had stayed in their positions to enrich themselves
througb illicit means (see esp. Zheng 1989 , White 1992).
To rebuild organizations and leadership at the rural grassroots , the Legal

A旺airs

Commission ofthe National People's Congress and the Ministry of CiviI A旺airs proposed

4

to reform the vi lI age comlnittees. Th e controversial grassroots democratization measures
proposed to increase accountability of vi lI age leaders to vi lI agers and establish the rights
and responsibilities of vilI ages in their relationship with the townships. Much of the
controversy in the national legislature focused on the relationship between vi lI age
committees and township governments: some deputies feared that elected committees
\vould not selve state interests or help implement policies handed do\vn by the townships;
other deputies called for nlore autonomy and greater empowerment of the committees
against the encroachlnents of township governments (see O'Brien 1994).
In 1987, after over a year of debate , the National People's Congress passed a draft
law on village C0 I11I11Ît tees , e 旺ective in June 1988. The law

de自 ned

vi lI age c0111mittees

as nlass organizations of self-government at the grassroots , popularly elected and
accountable to a village council comprised of all adult villagers. Village cOlnlnittees of
three to seven nlembers were to be nlade up of a director, deputy director, and ordinary
committee nlembers , a11 elected to three-year terms. Village conlmittees were to help
township governments to carry out their work , but , significantly, the committees were not
placed formally under the leadership of the townships or local party organizations
(Standing Comnlittee of the Sixth National People's Congress 24 Nov. 1987).
。在'e ring

villagers electoral choices was , and is , a key component of grassroots

democratization. O'Brien (1994) notes that official guidelines have ca lI ed for village
committee elections to feature some choice among candidates , with the result that most
vi lI ages have held senli-competitive elections (featuring one or Í\vo more candidates than
positions) and some have experimented with fully competitive elections (listing twice the
number of candidates as

position斗

By

the end of 1990, rudimentary elected village

committees had by and large replaced the old committees: newly elected village
committees numbered over a million , vi lI age leaders over four million (see table 1).

5

Implications for Congruence
To the extent that interested vi lI agers

participate 台eely

in competitive elections

that decide who leads vi lI ages , it nlakes sense to inquire into (and expect) congruence ,
along some relevant dimension , be t\v een vi lI age leaders and vilI agers. Yet, as Chinese
officials acknowledge , grassroots democratization is a longterm process , it began not long
ago , and progress has been uneven. Le aders at the township level , who are charged with
organizing vi lI age elections , have their own interests to secure. Ov erlapping lnemberships
on vi lI age party branches and vi lI age committees are conlnlon. Some vi lI age committee
elections are uncompetitive , l110st only selni-competitive.
calnpaigns. Given this state of

a在'airs ，

Practically none feature

\vhat are the real inlplications for congruence at

the rural grassroots?
Consider first the role of selectorates. The governnlent depar tInent specifically
charged with inlplelnenting grassroots democratization and charting its progress is the
Ministry of CiviI

A釘airs .

Chinese accounts of township involvement in village elections

after 1987 sometimes mention party committees , but practically always refer to
governments , which have overall responsibi Ii ty for setting up vi lI age committees. Election
outcomes

0 征訂趴70

indications that township leaders do not leave vi lI age elections

entirely to the vagaries of electorates: vi lI age committees usua lIy have representative
quotas of women (and minorities in vi lI ages with minorities) , and elected village leaders
are usua lIy also village
A在'airs

pa向，

branch leaders (Liaoning Provincial Department of Civil

1989 , Du 1990, Zhang .1992).

In the usual sense of the term in communist politics , a selectorate is a communist
par可 committee
ent句，

(and its organization department) , which has the authority to control

promotion , demotion , and eXÎt of

0伍 cials

for all positions on its assigned

nomen k1atura (see Manion 1984, 1985 , Burns 1987, 1989). After 1979 , when electoral

6

reform for elections to people's congresses (i. e. , above the viIIage

level) 。旺ered

voters

some choice among candidates and a chance to elect non-party menlbers as
representatives , communist party committees functioned as selectorates by vetting
candidates for poIitical correctness (Nathan 1985 , Womack 1982, 1982-83 , Jacobs 1985 ,
1991). Township party committees are not selectorates for viIIage leaders in the usual
sense , however, because viIIage leaders are not state cadres and are not on a
non1enklatura.

Nonetheless , township party and government leaders have a nUlnber of ways to
in f1 uence the selection process in viIIage elections. In extraordinary circumstances , if
village conl1nittees are "paralyzed ," township governlnents have the authority (indeed the
duty) to dislnantle theIn , conduct investigations , and ensure that capable village leaders
are elected -- \vhich can involve sending in their own candidates frOIn outside (Chen
1990, Shi 1990, Cui and Zhang 1990). More conlmonly , township governInents and party
committees function

as selectorates by influencing candidate nonlination and

monopolizing candidate vetting. In selecting candidates , township leaders consider the
performance of village incumbents and rely on suggestions (and

candidates) 台om

the

viIIage party branches. Candidate .nomination is also supposed to include a process of
"deliberation" and "consultation ," in which vi Il agers are mobilized in groups to suggest
and discuss potential candidates.

Township leaders play a 1110re direct role as

selectorates in the process of vetting potential candidates and reducing the number on
the ba Ilot to one or a few mOJ.e candidates than positions (see esp. Fujian Provincial
Department of Civil

A証airs

1990).

But if the above implies congruence between village leaders and their selectorates ,
it does not necessarily inlply a lack of congruence between village leaders and their
electorates. Al though some townships do organize uncompetitive elections , essentially
7

continuing the old practices of direct appointment and dislDissal (Zhang and Xi ao 1992) ,
most townships are weaker in their capacity as selectorates. Selectorates can influence
who appears on the ballots , but winning votes of villagers in semi-competitive elections
is generally the only way village leaders can gain office. Many provinces require that
village leaders win votes of a

m 吋 ority

of eligible voters (see , e.g. , Standing Committee

of the Seventh Fujian Provincial People's Congress 26 Dec. 1990).

Villagers have

withheld votes for candidates supported by the townships and successfully resisted
township efforts to disman t1 e "paralyzed" committees (Cunmin zhijie minzhu de you yi
ci shijian 1991). Even candidates \vho do not measure up in the political vetting process
have been elected as viIl age leaders (Li 1990).
Chinese elections do not feature campaigns , a fact that can have major
in1plications for congruence be 1:\veen leaders and citizens. Villages are relatively small
units , however: 1990 average vi lI age size was about 1200 (State StatisticaI Bureau 1993:
40) . Most adult villagers have Iived and worked together for lDost of their lives. Even
\vithout campaigns , villagers are likely to know candidates personally. Familiarity in a
small community context provides a basis for choosing Ieaders; it also creates incentives
for responsiveness to villagers. White (1992) observes that because village leaders and
their families remain in the community after their term is up , leaders are reluctant to
n1ake enelnies \vhile in

。但 ce .

To some degree , township selectorates can also find it in their interest to pay
attention to the electoral prefeJences of villagers. Township leaders fear that vi lI age
leaders will be responsive to the peasants who elect them , at the expense of the higherlevel authorities who rely on them as their "1egs" in grassroots implementation (Shi 1990).
Village leaders may be ultimately unsuccessful with coercive means to enforce
compliance with below-market grain procurement, family planning , colI ection of taxes
8

and local levies , recruitn1ent of unpaid labor, and other

1989 ,

Zha咚 1992).

Implementation may require active

unpopu
叫la
訂r

measures (Zhen

cooperation 台om

vi11agers.

Le aders who use coercion to implement unpopular measures may not initia11y lose

township support , but they can (and do) lose vi11age elections (Yueping County 1990,
Cunmin zhijie

mi血hu

de you yi ci shijian 1991). In vi11age elections , townships can fail

as selectorates if they incorrectly anticipate electoral support for candidates. Failure
after elections can be far lnore consequential , however: if elected vi Il age leaders cannot
elicit cooperation froln vi11agers , to\vnships lose their "legs."
In sun1 , the electoral connection in the Chinese countryside , however problematic ,
is in principle

su伍 ciently

strong to motivate an inquüy into congruence between village

leaders and t110se who choose theln , in c1 uding ordinary vi Il agers. Quite apart from that
rationale , however, studies of village life before deco lI ectivization and den1ocratization
suggest t11at congruence in the Chinese village context can elnerge through informal
n1echanisms -- as a product of comn1unity and culture , for lack of better terms. Before
the reforms , rural administration was highly centralized , but each successively lower level
was more responsive to demands frOD1 belo\v (Unger 1989). A1 though COlllmune party
committees dominated selection of production brigade leaders , those selected had a11
nsen 台om

the local peasant community. According to observers of vi11age po Ii tics ,

brigade leaders identified c1 0sely with their vi11age community and , when possible , sided
with vi11agers against the encroachment of the state or rival communities (Bums 1988 ,
Shue 1988). Vi11agers in f1 uenc.e d leaders mainly through informal means , by threats of
social ostracism or non-compliance , for example (Parish and Whyte 1978 , Burns 1988).
Pre-reform in f1 uence by peasants has nothing at a11 to do with a presumed electoral
connection -- and an electoral connection by no means signifies an end to informal
in f] uence in the villages. Th ere is more than one way to arrive at congruence between

9

village leaders and villagers.
Economic Ideology
The appropriate role of the state , relative to private individuals , as the agent to
promote and manage economic development , is a policy-relevant issue of considerable
inlportance in advanced industrialized democracies. For good reason , political scientists
treat it as a key conlponent of ideological orientation in those countries , with positions
on the issue corresponding to positions on the left-right dimension (see Huber 1989).
It is also a suitable focus for the analysis of congruence in the very

di旺'erent

context of

the Chinese viIIage , especially as a general left-right dinlension is not a useful survey
nleasure in tbat context. 2
More so than in advanced industrialized democracies. the econonlic role of the
state is the core policy issue in countries long dominated by central planning and state
o\vnership -- nlost of \vhich are rnaking serious

e 旺'o rts

to decentralize , marketize , and

privatize. For the Chinese , a1ready in their second decade of economic refonn , it has
becorne an issue of widespread relevance. Chinese industrial reforms have not included
privatization of state

enterp討 ses ，

but a main thrust of the reforms has been to promote

the growth of coIIective and private enterprises , to reduce the proportionate size of the
state secto r. Despite some anti-market orientations among conservative leaders , 0 伍 cial
policy in the reform period has been "sustained promotion" of the private secto r. Th is
has resulted in private enterprises emerging as an integral part of the economy by the
late 1980s (Young 1991). In the countryside , an estimated one in seven households were
owners of private enterprises by 1989 (Odegaard 1992).3
Th e relative importance of the state and private individual initiative in the

economy is a particularly good focus for analysis of congruence between viIIage leaders
and those who choose them. Village leaders act as economic managers of "small , multi10

dimensional businesses" (the villages) , adapting economic directives to local conditions
to meet a variety of co Il ective and personal goals (see esp. RozeIl e 1994). ViIl age leaders
have many responsibiIi ties , but promoting vi Il age economic development and creating an
environment in which vi Il agers can enrich themselves are among their lnost important
functions (Zhang 1992). State assignments such as family planning , labor conscription ,
and grain procurelnent are also important and undoubtedly shape the relationship
between leaders and ordinary villagers in important (and
unpopular tasks

0証'e r

di旺'e rent)

\vays. Yet , those

viIIage leaders comparatively little legitin1ate scope for

interpretation or innovative inlplementation. They are fairly rigid obligations handed
down the administrative hierarchy by township governlnents. By contrast , in providing
econo I11ic

leade 叫坤，

viIl age leaders have a range of choices (pennissible and not)

reflecting fundalnenta lIy

di 旺erent

notions about the best way to develop the economy.

Characterizing the econo111ic decisionmaking of local leaders in the countryside , Roze lI e

(1994: 124) refers to a "deep ambivalence" ofviIIage (and

townsl中)

leaders towards the

n1arket. Clearly , speci 自 c econonlic choices of vi Il age leaders can reflect a wide range of
orientations to the basic issue of the economic role of the state , relative to

pl甘 ate

individual initiative.
To measure positions on this issue , 1 used responses to questions about the
importance of state and individual private enterprises for economic developmen t. 1
argue below for a broad interpretation of responses , as positions on an economlC
ideology dimension.

The position of a leader or ordinary villager on the economic

ideology dimension is the

di在'e rence

between his responses to the following questions:

Here is a scale. Th e "0" on the scale indicates no importance and the "10"
indicates extreme importance.

How important would you say state

11

ente 1'prises (guoying qiye) are for economic development?
How important \vould you say individual [i.e. , p 1'ivate] ente叩rises (geti q秒。
are for economic development?4

Employing responses to both questions takes into account idiosyncratic

di旺erences

ln

implicit scales fo 1' evaluation (that , for example , one respondent's "9" may be
substantively equivalent to another's "8").
The analyses of congruence below ell1 ploy responses of vi lI age 1's and their elected
leaders in 56 vi lI ages , as \ve lI as leaders at the highe 1' to'wnship leve l. A1 1 of the villages
surveyed had unde 1'gone a round of elections since mid-1988 , when the la\v on village
COnlJl1 ittees

0血 cially

calne Ínto

e 証'e ct.

The nlass sanlple , considered here as a sall1 ple

of electorates for their respective village C0111 J11ittees , is a sinlple randonl sall1 ple of
resident adult
salllp
抖le
亡 19

vi l1 age
臼rs.

The 56 elected vi l1 age leaders sUlveyed are a non-probabili 句吵f

are directors of

白
t heir

village

∞
c oll1 ml圳
ttεes;

37 are village communist party

branch secretaries who serve concurrently as deputy directors 0 1' lnembers of village
cOll1 mittees.

The 40 township leaders surveyed are considered here as a sample of

selectorates for leaders in villages under their respective jurisdictions. They are a nonprobability sample , consisting of a communist party secretary or deputy secretary and a
township gove 1'nment head or deputy head in each of the twenty townships surveyed. 5
Table 2 reports frequency distributions for positions on the dimension , separately
fo 1' ordinary villagers , village leaders , and township leade 1's surveyed. 6 No claim of
gene 1' alizability is made for these descriptive results , because of the nature of the sample
(see Manion 1994). Interpreted narrowly , po圳 ons are evaluations of the additional
inlportance of state enterprises for economic development , relative to individual
enterprises. Positive positions assign greater inlportance to state ente 1'p 1'ises than to

12

individual enterprises. For this sample , this is the prevailing view in a11 three groups of
respondents: it accounts for 75 percent of mass responses and 88 percent of responses
for both groups of leaders.

Negative positions , by contrast , re f1 ect the view that

individual enterprises are relatively more importan t. A position of zero assigns equal
importance to

the 趴'0

forms of enterprises. AInong the three groups sU lV eyed , the

relative importance of individual enterprises is evaluated most highly by ordinary
villagers , less highly by village leaders , and least highly by to\vnship leaders. Al though
leaders do not employ the lo\ver end of the dimension , the distributions appear to re f1 ect
a fairly \vide range of positions. 7

[Table 2 about here]

Positions on the dÌInension , even in the narrow interpretation above , are of
obvious intrinsic interest. Th is paper presumes that they are also interpretable n10re
broadly , as ideological orientatio l1 s to a basic question of political economy.

The

presumption that the dünension is broadly lneaningful , representing economic ideological
orientations rather than views on a

speci 自 c

question about enterprises , can be examined

empirically. If positions on the dimension do in fact provide information about views on
related questions , then econon1ic ideo]ogy can be expected to predict those views in a
way that makes sense (in terms of direction) and satisfies tests of statistical significance.
Moreover , if positions on the dimension predict views on related questions , it not only
supports the presumption that the din1ension is broadly meaningful , but also indicates
that the questions used to construct the dimension were generally comprehended. Th at
is , it addresses the concern that positions on the dimension may simply re f] ect random
responses , a concern that is not unreasonable considering the fairly abstract qua]ity of
13

the questions and fai rI y low educational level of mass respondents.
Respondents in the mass sample were asked a number of questions that tap
orientations to econonlic reforms in the past decade and their outcomes. 1 speci自ed
responses to these questions as dependent variables in separate regression equations ,
with position on the economic ideology dimension and several demographic control
variables (sex, age , education , and household income) specified as independent variables.
The general finding of the exercise is reassuring: knowing a viIIager's econolllic ideology
is of

signi自cant

use in predicting his views on related issues. Results of the specific

regression analyses indicate that , relative to other viIIagers , those who place a higher
value on the inlportance of state enterprises for econonlic developnlen t: perceive the
e旺ects

of econonlic refornls as 1110re detrimental , assess opportunities provided by

marketization more negatively , more strongly associate l11arketization with rising prices ,
have a lower appraisal of the usefulness of individual enterprises , and are less tolerant
of large income inequalities generaIIy and higher than average incollles for individual
entrepreneurs

speci 自 cally.

In addition , higher evaluations of the importance of state

enterprises for economic developnlent are associated with

signi自 cantly

worse "feelings"

towards households that have prospered greatly under the rural economic reforms (wan

yuan hu) and towards private retailers

(佔
伊
ge
仰
et
t

a broad interpretation of positions on the
the direction and strength of

ec
∞
onoml此
c

叮
0 n記
en
削ta
刮ti必
∞
O
郎s tωo
n

ideology

刮
d imension

state management

as a measure of

昀
r elat趴
ive tωo

private

individual initiative in economic developmen t.
Choosing a Measure of Central Tendency
An alysis of congruence examines how close leaders are to the center of their

constituencies.

In aggregating positions of the electorate , more recent studies of

congruence usuaIIy take into account the different impIi cations of the mean and median

14

as measures of central tendency.9 As analyses of congruence are motivated in large part
by a normative interest in the

quali句 of

representation in the system , it is \vorthwhile to

consider the normative implications of the

di旺'erent

measures when the mean and

From a normative perspective, the mean has the intuitive

median do not coincide.

appeal of a focus on congruence between leaders and the average citizen. Th is appeal
is weakened , however , by an early 1'esult of social choice theory: on a single dimension
and assuming single-peaked preferences , the lnedian is the only position a majo 1'ity
prefers to all others (see Black 1948). Moreove 1', compared to the median , the mean
gives g1'eate 1' weight to positions fa 1'the 1' f1'om the cente r. T-his p 1' esents a no 1'mative
rationale fo 1'

choosi 時 the

median ove 1' the nlean: as Hube 1' and Po\vell (1994: 296)

argue , there is "no justification in democratic theory fo 1' pernlitting mino 1'ities to prevail
over majo 1'ities or for giving greater weight to ideologically extrelne citizens."
F 1'onl a positive perspective , the spatial theory of elections

0旺'ers di旺erent

predictions (depending on the nunlber of cOlnpetitors and the electoral systenl) about
where candidates or parties wi lI position themselves , relative to the electorate , on a
dinlension. Applying the

Hotelli時 model

to the study of politics , Downs (1957) showed

that cOlnpetition to nlaXÌnlize votes inlpels both pa 1'ties in a t\vo-pa 1'ty system to c1 uster
a 1'ound the position of tbe median vote r.
demonstrated that pa 1'ties in a

Advances in spatial tbeory have since

multipar句 context

have incentives to compete by

dispersing , with greater centrifugal incentives in systems with more competitors (Cox

1987, 1990). But wbether candidates

0 1'

pa 1'ties compete by buncbing at the median or

dispersing along an ideological dinlension , the competitor at tbe median is the predicted
\vinner , in some sense of the tenn: unde 1' plurality electoral rules where only one
competitor can win , tbe predicted winner is the one nearest tbe median; under
proportional representation , \vhere no single par可

15

is

likely to win a majority of seats , the

median party can be expected to dominate government formation (Laver and Schofield

1990: 89-143).
A spatial model of elections in Chinese villages is outside the scope of this paper.
More to the point , such a model would not

0旺'e r

positive theoretical guidance here in

the form of a prediction that leaders in the sample are closer to the lnedian position of
villagers than to the mean , or vice versa. lO Village leaders are elected by plurality rules
through a bloc vote procedure , in which vi lI agers cast votes (in one or two separate
elections) for severalleaders: a director , deputy director, and as n1any other candidates
for the vi lI age cO Illmittee as there are positions. ll

In villåges \vith some electoral

cOlnpetition , more than three candidates are nominated for cOlnmittee positions and at
least three are elected. Assun1Î ng villagers vote for candidates nearest to their own
positions , \vinners can be predicted to be nearer to the village Inedian than losers. A
vi lI age leader in the sample

he 院 however，

is a draw of one of at least three (and as

n1any as seven) winning candidates in the village. Am ong \vinners , the vi lI age leader in
the sample here can be the one furthest from the vi lI age median. Depending on the
shape of the distribution of positions of vi lI agers , vi lI age leaders in the sample can be
nearer to the village n1ean than to the median .
Further , congruence in the Chinese village context can also be a product of nonvoting processes , some of \vhich suggest the mean can be the more suitable prediction.
For example , if wealthy vi lI agers are in t1 uential villagers and if wealth is associated with
private entrepreneurship , the most in t1 uential villagers may be those with the most
extreme posltlons.
Without a c1 ear positive theoretical rationale or normative expectations to
recommend one measure of central tendency over another , 1 begin the analysis of
congruence below by specifying two models: one using tbe median as tbe aggregate
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measure for positions of vi lI agers , the other using the mean.
Congruence Beh\'een Village Leaders and Their Electorates and Selectorates
Th e analyses in this section inquire into the existence of statisticalIy and

substantively

signi自 cant

congruence between vi l1 age leaders and their electorates and

selectorates , asking: do electorates and selectorates of vi lI age leaders matter , in a way
tapped by the econo111ic ideology dimension? An alyses of congruence in established
Ii beral den10cracies can reasonably assume

signi 自 cant

congruence , as a product of

democratic processes , and focus instead on estin1ating the amount of congruence in the
system or comparing congruence across institutional variants .of liberal democracy. In
the Chinese vi lI age context of 1990 , however , it is quite clea rI y possible tbat neither
electorates nor selectorates

nlatter 一 or

that they do matter , but in a \vay not re f1 ected

in economic ideology.

1 inquire into the existence of congruence through nlultivariate regression , \vith
vi lI age leader position on tbe economic ideology din1ension as the dependent variable.
The independent variables that test the hypotheses of analytic interest are aggregate
n1easures of the positions of ordinary vi lI agers (i.e. ,
(i.e. , selectorates) on the dimension . Employing

electo別的)

Ache的 (1978)

and township leaders

notion and measure of

congruence as responsiveness , the analyses estimate the degree to which vi lI age leaders
can be considered responsive to those who choose them. Thus coefficients for the 1\vo
independent variables described are interpretable as amounts by which a vi lI age leader
can be expected to change bis position as his electorate or selectorate changes position
by one unit on the economic ideology dimension , other things equa l.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis using sample vi lI age mean (or
median) po圳ons on the dimension as an independent variable presents two kinds of
estimation problems.

Both result 台om constructing the independent variable as an
17

aggregate nleaSUre based on sma I1 samples at the village leve l.
heteroskedastici句，

problem:

di宜erent

The 自 rst

is a

sample variances of village mean (and median)

positions wi I1 produce inefficient estimates and overly optimistic standard errors. Th e
second is an error-in-variable problem: estinlates of village population means (and
medians) contain nleasurement error , which wi I1 produce underestimates of the
coe出 cient

for village mean (and median) positions.

Th e conventional approach to

correcting for heteroskedasticity is weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis.
Independent variables are weighted by the reciprocal of the square root of their
variances , so that obseIVations with large variances have less iIhpact on the analysis than
those \vith snlall variances. For the analyses below , 1 constructed a weight variable using
results frolll the OLS regression and the sample variance of village means. 12 The WLS
analyses partially correct for the estÎInation problems , but coefficients are still
underestinla tes.
Village leaders in the sample share a number of basic characteristics:
ovenvhelming妙，

they are male , cOlllmunist party members , and grew up in the village.

With practically no variation on these potentially relevant control variables , it Illakes no
sense to include them in the analysis.

There is more variation on other basic

characteristics , ho\vever, which 1 do include as control variables: village leader's age ,
education , and household income leve l. 13

Results of the OLS and WLS regression

analyses are presented in table 3. Models 1 and 2 di在er only in the measure of central
tendency that aggregates positions of villagers on the economic ideology dimension.
Model 1 uses the village median; Model 2 uses the village mean.

[Table 3 about here]
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OLS and WLS regression results are nearly identical , although the smaIl er
standard errors of the WLS regressions show some
heteroskedasticity.

e旺ect

of the correction for

Control variables are not statisticaIly significant in the models. 14

Turning to the variables of analytic interest, in both models the position of township
leaders is statisticaIly significant in a direction predicted by congruence. This is not too
surprising , considering the interest and practical involvement of township selectorates in
choosing vi Il age leaders. It is reassuring , however , that the connection is in fact re f1 ected
in congruence along the economic ideology dimension.

As for ordinary vi Il agers ,

although the n1edian and mean are very highly correlated , the

coef自 cients

in the two

models di 証er considerably.15 From an inferential perspective , ho\vever , the result is the
same: both measures of the position of the village n1ass salnple are statistically
significant , in a direction predicted by congruence.
The results of the analyses support the conclusion that electorates and selectorates
n1atter , in a way re f1 ected by comparing positions on the broad , policy-relevant economic
ideology dinlension. In statistical ternls , village leaders are significantly responsive to
those who choose them. In substantive terms too , the findings indicate t11at electorates
and selectorates matter significantly. The amount of responsiveness to electorates , for
exanlple , can be expressed in the following way. Mean positions of villagers range in
value from -.33 to 5 .1, a range of 5.4 points; multiplying this by the

coe血 cient

for the

vi Il age mean yields a product of 3.6. As the range in positions for vi Il age leaders is 13
points , village electorates can be considered to "move" leaders more than one-fourth of
this range -- a result that is , in my view , striking in its substantive signi自 cance.
Democratization and Congruence Between Village Leaders and Their Electorates

Th e finding of substantively and statistically significant congruence between vi Il age
leaders and ordinary vi Il agers is consistent with an optimistic view of democratization in
19

the Chinese countryside. Yet , congruence in the vi lI ages can emerge from processes that
have nothing to do with democratization. Is congruence between village leaders and
villagers a product of the changes in rural political organization that prompted this
inquiry?
The uneven progress of grassroots democratization supplies the basis for an
answe r. If democratization is an important source of the ideological congruence between
vi lI age leaders and ordinary villagers , then inter-vi lI age variation in congruence can be
expected to re f1 ect variation in the institutions , practices , and attitudes associated with
recent e缸'o rts to democratize the vi lI ages. Other things equal , leaders in villages that are
further along in inlplementing the democratizing llleasures of the law on vi lI age
committees will be nearer, on the econolnic ideology dimension , to their village
constituents than leaders in vi lI ages that lag behind in implementation.
Dependent

Val切 bles:

Proxùn ity and Centrism

Achen (1978) develops two lneasures of co 月ruence in terms of distance between
leaders and their constituents. The most straightforward measure of congruence as
distance is

pro刃 mity

(of positions on a dimension) of leaders to constituents. Proxinlity

is the average squared distance be t\veen a leader and his constituents. 1 estinlate it for
the sample here by squaring the

di証'e rence

dimension , of a village leader and each

in positions , on the economic ideology

vilI ager 台om

the sample of his electorate and

computing the village nlean of those squared distances. The lower the proximity score ,
the nearer village leaders are to villagers; the higher the proxinlity score , the more
distan t. Congruence lneasured as proximity represents outcomes: it takes no account of
inter-village di在erences in the shape of the distribution of positions of villagers. Th us
proXlml句，

can be low because vilI agers are sharply divided between extrelnes on tbe

dimension , making it di伍 cult for a village leader who is near the middle of vi lI agers to
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be very near the vi lI age average. By contrast, proximity in a very homogeneous vi lI age
can be higher, simply because of a narrower distribution.

To analyze congruence

between leaders and vi lI agers , given some distribution of positions in the vi lI age , requires
a measure that takes the variance of the distribution into accoun t. Achen's measure of
congruence as centrism , which subtracts variance from proximity , does tha t. 1 estimate
it here as the

di旺'e rence

between the estimated

pro近ml句 (of

a leader to vi lI agers) and

the vi lI age variance in positions on the economic ideology dünension. As with proximi紗，
the lower the centrism score , the nearer village leaders are to villagers; the higher the
centrisnl score , the more distan t. Achen (1978: 488) sunlmarizes the intuitive distinction
between

the 趴'0

measures as follo\vs: if prOxi I11ity is a measure of outcolnes , centrism is

a Ineasure of the leader's perfornlance; whatever the leader's proxilnity, centrism
measures his ability to minÏInize it. The Í\vo nleasures of congruence as distance are the
dependent variables in the nlultivariate regression analyses below.
Independent

Because it has

speci 自 c

r旬 riables

responsibility to ünplement measures on grassroots

denlocratization, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and its departments under local
governments investigate progress in inlplementation and publicize local experience.
Reports and recomlnendations of civil affairs

0伍 cials

provide exce lI ent insight into inter-

vi lI age variation in democratization and , in so doing , identi有， and substantiate key
independent variables for the analysis of congruence. To be sure , ideological congruence
per se never appears as a dependent variable in the accounts , but 。但 cials do try to
explain outcomes such as success (or failure) of candidates to win a m 吋 ority of votes in
village elections , strong (or weak) orientations of vi lI age leaders to be responsive to
vilI agers , and good (or poor) relations between village leaders and vi lI agers , for example.
Am ong the 56 villages surveyed , data on the relevant vi lI age committee elections
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are available for only 26 (spread across nine of the twenty townships , in two counties).
Unquestionably , some measure of inter-viIIage variation in electoral arrangements is
crucial to an analysis of the relationship between congruence and democratization. This
limits the analyses below to those 26 viIIages for which data on elections are available. 16
Electoral Competitiveness. Electoral competitiveness is an important, obvious , and

eas iI y measured index of progress in democratization. Chinese accounts link electoral
cOlnpetitiveness to mass interest in the elections , voter turnout , and the quality of
relations between elected leaders and viIIagers. For example , one account describes the
negative reactions (in c1 uding abstention fron1 voting) ofviIIagers to baIIots that are "cakes
in the pan , waiti時
and Shi 1990).

旭

only

for [voters] to go through the motions of lighting the fire" (Zhen
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con c1 udes that

more competition prolnotes mass interest in the elections and produces winners with a
stronger orientation to selve the vi11agers (Fujian Provincial DepartInent of Civil

A釘aus

In the 26 villages for which data are available , elections were uncompetitive in
three: 自ve

candidates were listed for five positions. Most viIIages listed about a third

again as many candidates as positions. The most con1petitive elections (in three vi11ages)
listed more

than 趴70-thirds

again as many candidates as positions. Th e lneasure of

electoral competitiveness in the analyses below is the proportion of candidates that voters
can reject in fi11ing vi11age cOll1mittee positions (without resorting to write-in candidates)
一 that 色，

number of excess candidates divided by number of positions. To the degree

that elections 。在'e r them choices , vi lI agers can reject candidates with positions distant
from tbeir own in favor of candidates nearer to them. As higher values reÐect greater
competitiveness and greater opportunity for vi lI agers to reject some candidates in favor
of others , the predicted relationship between electoral competitiveness and proximi句7and
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centrism is negative: other things equal , the greater the competitiveness , the sma lI er the
distance be Í\veen leaders and villagers.

Interest in Elections, Voter Turnout, and Attendance at Meetings.
according to official guidelines , village elections

0旺'e r

If organized

villagers several opportunities to

participate even before voting. Th ese include study sessions to learn about their rights
and the functions of the new village conlmittees , infornlal group deliberations to propose
and discuss potential nominees for positions on the committees , and village meetings to
nOlninate candidates and then hear those on the

自 nal

ba lI ot defend their qualifications

for leadership. Actual response to these opportunities to participate varies greatly. At
one extreme , for exanlple , viPagers in an An hui village nominated 83 candidates and held
five voting sessions to elect their village conunittee , but vi l1 agers in many other localities
relnain uninterested and participate only after Inobilizational efforts by election
organizers

(Zha 時 1992).

Up to the nlid-1980s, Chinese peasants generally ignored elections as a nleans of
in f1 uencing public affairs , allowing officials at higher levels to dominate selection of
leaders.

Peasants voted , but this was a political ritual to \vhich they attached littI e

practical significance (Burns 1988). Chinese accounts often attribute peasant apathy
about more recent elections (considered a sign of low
levels of education in the

∞
c ountrηy屯叫
S討ide

"dεmocratic ∞
c O郎 CIO 叩

and the lack of

位
e xper吋ience

with democracy

historically.
Interest (or lack of interest) in the elections has obvious inlplications for
congruence between village leaders and viIIagers: insofar as villagers persist in viewing
elections as largely irrelevant channels of in f1 uence , that view can be self-fulfi lI ing.
Peasants who see the elections as useful channels to in f1 uence village a証aus are more
likely , for example , to become informed about candidates , perhaps even to bave
23

influenced candidate selection. By contrast , votes of completely uninterested villagers
are sin1Ílar to randonl draws of candidates from the ballo t. To the degree that votes
correspond to randonl draws , the relationship

be仰een

positions of voters and positions

of winners will also be random.
Th e most direct attitudinal measure of interest in village elections from the survey

instrunlent is an itenl that asks mass respondents to indicate their level of interest in
village elections by choosing one of fo盯

responses (ranging 台om 市 ot

interested" to "very

interested"). For the analyses below , the measure of interest in village elections is the
village mean of responses to that item. It ranges from 1. 8 to 3.4 in the 26 villages. As
higher values re f1 ect greater interest , the predicted relationship
prOXll111 可 and

be 仰een

interest and

centrism is negative: other things equal , the higher the interest in village

elections in the village , the snla lI er the distance between vi lI age leaders and vi lI agers.
Behavioral indicators can also reflect interest in vi lI age elections. The lllost
obvious is voter turnou t: villagers \vho are really not interested in the elections will not
vote in them . Voter turnout in the relevant village elections is part of the data available
for 26 of the vi lI ages surveyed . Average voter turnout for those villages is 88 percent ,
with values ranging from 59 to 97 percen t. A second , less obvious , behavioral indicator
is attendance at village meetings. Villagers who are interested in village affairs (and who
consider formal channels of influence use臼 1) are likely to attend village meetings ,
including meetings that nominate candidates for village committee positions and publicize
candidate qualifications. Mass respondents in the survey were asked whether or not they
had attended a recent village meeting. From valid responses to that itenl , 1 constructed
a village-level measure of attendance at village meetings as the percentage of respondents
who indicated they had attended a recent village meeting. Th e mean across all 26
villages is 50 percent , with individual village values dispersed across practically the full
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range

--台om

0 to 94 percen t.

As indicators of interest in vi lI age elections , however, these apparently obvious
behavioral measures may be problematic. Burns (1988) notes tbat before the recent
changes in political organization , local elections and nleetings had a strong mobilizational
characte r. Even in recent years , voter turnout and attendance at village meetings may
re f1 ect better the ability of election organizers and vi lI age leaders to mobilize villages
tban the level of mass interest in the elections and village

a 旺airs.

1t is obvious from

Chinese accounts that high voter turnout and high levels of participation in candidate
nOlnination are accepted as important indicators of success in grassroots delnocratization.
Because they are easily quantifiable indicators , they are also useful criteria for higherlevel evaluations of to\vnship perfornlance in organlzlng the elections

一 and

this

transforms thenl into perfornlance targets for townships and viIIages. Moreover , at least
sOlne provlnces

。他 cially

stipulate min Îlnum voter turnout rates (usuaIIy 50 percent) for

viIIage elections to be declared valid (see , e.g., Standing COlnmittee of the Seventh
Fujian Provincial People's Congress 26 Dec. 1990).
If voter turnout and attendance at village meetings are essentially products of
lnobilization , tbey can be unrelated to interest in elections and congruence between
vi lI age leaders and vi Il ages.

Mobilization for high voter turnout can also re f1 ect an

authoritarian approach to organizing the elections; bigh attendance at vi Il age meetings
can re f1 ect strong mass dissatisfaction with election outcomes. If so , high voter tumout
and attendance at vi Il age meetings can be negatively related to congruence. Finally , if
both e在'e cts are opera ting , they can 0旺set one anotbe r. For these reasons , 1 do not
specI有， a direction of relationship between tbese Í\vo behaviorallneasures and proximity

and centrism.

1 include tbese measures in the analyses below for two reasons: the

plausibility of their relationship to congruence (in one way or anotber) , and the
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plausibility of their correlation with electoral competitiveness and the attitudinal measure
of interest in village elections (which implies they should not be left in the error term) .
Village Size. Chinese accounts indicate that it is more difficult to get villagers to

participate in the meetings and other activities associated with elections when villages are
large or the population is widely dispersed (see Qi 1990, Zhen and Shi 1990, Cunmin
zhijie minzhu de you yi ci shijian 1991 ,

Zha月 1992).

As a result , in those villages ,

villagers are less knowledgeable about their rights , village committee functions , and
qualifications of specific candidates for leadership. Elections in larger villages are thus
nlore formalistic than in smaller villages. 17

Village size has direct ünplications for

congruence between village leaders and villagers because of its presumed relationship to
informed voting.

The accounts not only identify village size as an intrinsic analytic

variable , they also indicate a relationship between village size and other independent
variables (such as voter turnout and attendance at village meetings) in tbe analyses.
Tbe 26 villages in the sample vary significantly in population size: two are
populated by fewer than 500 villagers; four bave populations of over 2000. 18 Th ere are
a number of ways to construct a measure to analyze the relationsbip be 1:\veen village size
and congruence , but Cbinese accounts certainly suggest an indicator variable. Deciding
what constitutes a large village is not completely arbitrary. A couple of the accounts that
discuss problematic "large villages" are specific: electorate size is 1520 in one and 1400
in another (Zhen and Shi 1990, Cunmin zhijie

mi也hu

de you yi ci shijian 1991). With

these accounts as a reference point , 1 constructed a large village indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 for villages with electorates at or above 1400 and 0 for smaller
villages. Th e predicted relationship be t\veen large village size and proximity and centrism
is positive: other things equal , villagers in large villages are more distant from their
leaders , compared to villagers in smaller villages.
26

Incumbency. Th e independent variables discussed above all consider congruence
between village leaders and villagers as a product of processes associated with recent
efforts at grassroots democratization. Th ese processes relate essentially to electoral
choice , that is , choices villagers make as voters. An alternative set of explanations for
inter-village variation in congruence focuses instead on choices village leaders make.
Leaders who have more experience in positions of village leadership nlay be significantly
nearer (or more distant) to their village constituents on a policy-relevant dimension such
as economic ideology.
L疋 aders with 1110re

experience in village leadership may better represent prevailing

issue orientations of villagers because they are better able to represent thenl: they know
the vi lI agers and their positions bette r. The more falniliar a leader is with where the
average vi lI ager stands , the better able he is to place hünself at that position . Th us intervillage variation in congruence between village leaders and vi lI ages can simply re f] ect
variation in bow fanliliar vi lI age leaders are \vith views in their constituency. Holding a
position of leadership in tbe village provides leaders \vith the incentive and opportunity
to learn where villagers stand on policy-relevant issues that

a旺Cct

their daily lives. By

this reasoning , more experienced village leaders know their constituents better and , for
this reason , are better able to represent them.
In 1990 , however , the more experienced village leaders are those who held power
in the period before villagers elected leaders in semi -competitive elections to the ne\v
village committees. Th e more experienced village leaders are those who measured up
to standards applied by the higher-level authorities dominating selection. Experienced
village leaders in the sample are experienced and successful at satisfying higher levels
and , therefore , may be more secure in their positions of leadership. By tbis reasoning ,
more experienced village leaders have Iess need to represent villagers in their respective
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cons tI tuencies.
A measure of experience in viIl age leadership can be constructed frolll detailed
career history data that viIl age leaders provided in respollse to specific questions. 1
summed up , for each leader sU lV eyed in the 26 vi lI ages , the number of years reported in
any position of leadership at the vi lI age level to create an inculllbency variable for the
analyses below. For the 26 vi lI age leaders in the sample , the variable takes

values 台om

1 to 38 years in a position of vi lI age leadership , with a mean of 17 years across villages.
As the discussion above is ambivalent about the direction of the variable's

e 缸'e ct，

1 do

not specify a predicted direction of relationship be t\veen incunlbency and proximity and
centrislll.
1 also in c1 ude village-levellneasures of inCOllle and education in the analyses as
control variables. InCOlne is 1990 mean per capita income in the village. 19 Education is
from the sU lV ey data: it is the nlean years of fonnal schooling of nlass respondents.
Results are presented in table 4. Where a direction of e缸'e ct is predicted , the test
of statistical significance is one-tailed. Otherwise , the test is t\vo-tailed. For illustrative
purposes , the table

presents 趴'0

regressions with proximity as the dependent variable.

Th e second in c1 udes variance in positions of villagers as an independent variable. This

is similar to considering the

e 旺'e ct

(on

pro近mity)

of

di在ere叫 shapes

of village

distributions as an argument about model misspecification. Th at argunlent predicts a
positive relationship between variance and proximity. As village leaders cannot be as
near to the vi lI age average in villages with a wider spread of positions , compared to more
homogeneous viIl ages , the higher the variance , the more distant the village leader to
villagers , other things equal. A comparison of the 趴'0 proximity models highlights the
effect of the distribution shape on congruence.
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[Table 4 about here]

Despite some fairly strong correlations between independent variables (which can
present a multicollinearity problem) and the small number of observations , the

e旺'e ct

of

a11 but one of the sÏx variables of analytic interest is statistically significant and in the
predicted direction , \vhere a direction is specified , when variance in the shape of
distributions in the vi11ages is included (on either side of the equation). The
incumbency is statistically insignificant, which may be due to the

0 証setting

of

e証'e ct

of

e在'e cts

in

opposite directions.
T\\TO

sets of results stand out in the analyses. Th e first has to do with grassroots

democratization. Electoral competitiveness , the most obvious , unambiguous , and reliably
measured index of grassroots democratization , is statistica11y significant in the predicted
direction in a11 three models. NO Í\vithstanding the interest and capacity of township
selectorates to intluence which candidates appear on final ba11ots , villagers choose the
winners; the more opportunity vi11agers have to reject some candidates in favor of others ,
the nearer \vinners are to the vi11agers who choose them. Th e

signi 自 cance

of having

choices , which seems rather trite in the abstract, is an important finding here because it
o宜'ers

empirical reassurance that context , however

di在'e rence:

can only make so much

other things equal , in Chinese villages as in many other contexts , voter choice

and representation go togethe r.
elections

di釘'e rent，

a在ect

Related旬，

not only do institutions such as competitive

congruence between leaders and vi11agers , but also attitudes associated

with democratization are importan t. Other things equal , congruence between leaders
and vi11agers is in significant pa此 a product of how interested villagers are in the
electoral process that produces their leaders. Where vi11agers are more interested in that
process , the result is leaders who are signi自 cantly closer to them.
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A second set of results suggests the relevance of context, although they are less
clearcut in interpretation. Th ey likely have to do with mobilization. In all three models ,
the relationship between

proximi可 and

centrism and attendance at village meetings is

significant and positive. In models that take variance in mass positions into account , the
e 在ect

of voter tumout is similarly significant and positive.

behavioral measures may in fact nleasure

di旺erent

things.

Certainly,

these 趴70

Nonetheless , the

straightforward empirical finding is that , at the village level of analysis , higher levels of
participation in these activities are associated with greater distance between village
leaders and villagers. One reasonable explanation is that in 1990, as in the past , both
measures re f1 ect the ability of higher authorities (at the township and village

levels) 的

mobilize the peasant lnasses to participate in not altogether voluntary activities. A clear
inlplication of O'Brien's (1994) account of implementation of the "complex and perhaps
contradictory combination of goals" of the law on village conlmittees is that
representative leadership in auton01110US villages is not always the sort of leadership
associated \vith successful execution of unpopular state assignments. Village leaders who
are better at mobilizing the masses may be poorer at representing them.
Conclusion
Th e analyses presented in this paper look for , and find , a connection between

leaders and citizens of a sort that has , for obvious reasons , not been prominent in the
study of communist politics , much less peasant politics in one of the world's few
remaining communist countries.

Despite the important changes in Chinese village

organization and the 0的 cial (and unofficial) enthusiasm about grassroots democratization
that prompted this inquiry, it is surely the case that the null hypothesis of no significant
congruence be Í\veen village leaders and villagers , along a policy-relevant dimension such
as the economic ideology dimension employed here , is at least as plausible as its
30

alternate. Th e findings of statistically and substantively significant congruence between
village leaders and their constituents are thus a little surprising. Moreover , congruence
between village leaders and villagers is not (or not exclusively) a product of informal
in f1 uences in small village communities. 1t results in significant part from the institutions
and attitudes associated with recent
signi自cant

e 証'o rts

at grassroots democratization. Th ere is also

congruence along the economic ideology dÍlnension between village leaders

and their township selectorates , which is perhaps not surprising , although the null
hypothesis is still by no means a stra\v man.
Th e questions posed in the analyses above

di 旺'e r

somewhat , as is

approp討 ate ，

from those posed about congruence in established liberal democracies. 1n the liberal
democratic context , political scientists can reasonably assullle significant congruence
related to denlocratic processes and move on to lllore interesting analytical questions
about congruence. It may be sOlne time yet before research on Chinese politics can
similarly treat congruence be t\veen leaders and citizens as routine. Moreover, although
the data used here are unsuitable for estimating the aUlount of congruence in Chinese
villages (see Manion 1994) , there is nothing in the analyses to suggest grassroots
democratization (or any other process , for that matter) has produced responsiveness ,
proximity , or centrism in amounts comparable to the estimates for liberal democracies.
Nor should \ve e:xp ect this , considering the ambivalent character of democracy in the
socialist context. Chinese political reform , bold as it is in that context , has by no means
quite abandoned the Le ninist

p~radigm

of representation of objective mass interests for

the liberal deUlocratic paradigm of representation of subjective mass preferences.
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NOTES

Hunan , Hebei , and Tianjin. Townships are a
strati自ed probabili句 sample of five townships representing di旺'erent population and
income strata within each county. Villages are a probability proportionate to size sample
of three (administrative) villages within each selected township. Data from only 56 of
the sÏx句T villages surveyed are employed in this analysis. Interviewers were unable to
locate a village leader for interviewing in one of the villages , and three village leaders
failed to respond to one of the items used to construct positions on the economic
ideology dinlension.
1. Th e counties are located in

Anh凶，

2. A left-right dimension has the attractive feature of ideological breadth , which is
particularly important for the analysis of congruence. We cannot meaningfully aggregate
preferences of citizens on nlany specific issues to come up with an unambiguous
evaluation of representation. Positions on the left-rigbt dÏIn~nsion offer a solution as
they fairly reliably reflect orientations to nlany issues on a single dimension (see Huber
1989). In tbe Chinese context , "left" and "right" are provocative terms , witb a political
meaning that changes frequently. Th us even if the terms were not viewed as too
politically sensitive to in c1 ude in a survey instrument (or, in this analysis , too abstract for
peasants) , this situation nlakes self-placement of Chinese respondents on a left-right
dinlension difficult to interpret substantively.
3. The official figure is one in t\velve households , but Odegaard (1992) estinlates the
actual nunlber as c1 0ser to one in seven.
4. Respondents \\'ere a1so asked to evaluate the ÏInportance of coIIective enterprises for
economic deve10pnlent. 1 do not use responses to this question because there is no
unanlbiguous interpretation of the importance of collective enterprises in a broader
ideological sense. Most rural coIIective enterprises are managed by the to\vnship
governlnent or vi11age administration: as such , they combine adlninistrative management
and local initiative , sharing features of state and individual enterprises. This intermediate
status , which frustrates an ideological interpretation of responses , is reflected in Pearson
correlations of responses evaluating the importance of the three forms of enterprises.
Evaluations of state and collective enterprises are highly correlated (.47 for masses , .51
for leaders) , as are evaluations of collective and individual enterprises (.47 for masses. ,
.35 for leaders). By contrast , respondents distinguish c1 early between state and individual
enterprises: correlation coe 自 cients for evaluations of these two fonns of enterprise are
relatively low (.12 for masses , .14 for leaders).
5. Note that while electorates are unique to village leaders in the sanlple , leaders in
villages located in the same township have the same selectorate. As there are twenty
selectorates for the 56 village leaders , each is a selectorate for four or five of the village
leaders.
6. Am ong 1096 completed mass interviews in the 56 villages , 34 percent of respondents
repo此ed no position on one or both items , yielding 721 valid observations for analysis
in the mass sample. Nearly half of a11 cases dropped because of missing data are
respondents with no formal schooling. Th e mass sample used for the analysis of
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congruence does nonetheless include 119 respondents with no schooling , accounting for
17 percent of the sample (sti1110wer than the 28 percent of mass respondents with whom
interviews were compl的 d and who have no schooling). Anlong respondents with at
least some schooling , there is little di旺erence in the education distribution of a11 mass
respondents with whom interviews were completed and that of the subsample of
respondents who responded to both items.
7. A separate analysis of variance , aggregating responses in the nlass sample by vi11age ,
indicates inter-vi11age variation significant at the .05 leve l.
8. 1 selected as dependent variables twelve items from the survey instrument that, in
principle , tap positions on questions of economic ideology. In eight of the twelve
regression analyses , economic ideology is significant in the predicted direction , with a
i te
臼ms
level of statistical significance at at least .05 for six 江
tailed 伽
te
臼S叫 T
刊
he 此
i tenls 仰叫nnlan叫 in the te泣 Specific questions are as fo11ows
Two regression analyses feature dependent variables selected fr_om a feeling thermometer
batte 吼 which asks respondents to indicate feelings (on a 100-point scale) about 10 ,000yuan households and private retailers. A third regression analysis elnploys responses to
the foIIowing question as tbe dependent variable: "How detrÏInental do you think the
econonlic refonns have been for this county? Would you say negative effects of the
refonns aUlount to a great many , many , some , or only a few?" Five regression analyses
feature as dependent variables 的ponses (on a four-point scale) indicating views ranging
froln strong agreement to strong disagreenlent with the foIIowing statelnents: "For the
vast majority, the open Inarket bas not provided opportunities to get rich. "The open
market is a Inajor cause of nSlng prices." "It is better not to start up individual
enterprises , because there is a cbance they \viII fai l." "Inconle ceilings should be set to
prevent very large incollle inequalities." "It is alright if those who start up individual
enterprises have higher incomes than the average person."
1I

9. If positions on tbe dimension are distributed sYlnmetricaIIy in the population, the
choice of a measure of central tendency is moot , as a practical issue , regardless of
whether the tbeoretical interest is the median or the mean: the mean is the most efficient
estimator of the population median (as we11 as the population Inean). If tbe distribution
is not symmetrical , however , tben the principle of analogy suggests tbe sample median
as the estimator of the population median. 1 do not assume positions on the economic
ideology dimension are distributed symmetrically in the population of interes t.
10. Note tbat the problenl does not present itself for selectorates: as eacb selectorate
sanlple contains only 趴10 township leaders , the median equals the mean.
11. Th is summary fails to reflect the tremendous variety of electoral practices in the
villages , but it is not inconsiste_Rt with any 1 have encountered in my readings.
12. Let: yi = economic ideology position of village leader in viIIage i, mi = true
economic ideology position of tbe mean of viIIagers in viIIage i, ~ = estimated econonlic
ideology position of the mean of viIIagers in village i, Zi = vector of control variables for
village i, vi = measurement error in economic ideology position of the mean of viIIagers
in village i, and ~ = mi + vi. Th en the true model is: yi = a + b mi + IZ j + e j . Th e
estimated model is: yi = a + b (只 -Vi)+lzi+ei or yi=a +bR+|Zi+ei-bvi.Th e
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disturbance in the estimated model is: ei . bvi , and the weight variable for WLS is an
estimate of the reciprocal of the square root of its variance. An estimate of variance (ei )
is: (standard error of the 0 凶 regression )2. An d an estimate of variance (bvi ) is: b 2 .
sample variance of the mean of vi11agers in vi11age i. Le t: w = (standard error of the
O凶 regression)2 + b 2 . sample variance of the mean of vi11agers in vi11age i. Th en the
weight variable for WLS is: w- l12 • Th e weight variable for the WLS model that uses the
nlass median , instead of the mean , as the measure of central tendency for vi lI age mass
position is constructed from the standard error and coe血 cient 台om the OLS regression
for that model , but uses the sample variance of the vi11age mea l1 to estimate vi .
13. Age is year of birth , education is years of schooIi ng , and household income level is
an ordinal variable t11at categorizes reported household income for 1989 (in
叫
ch吋1I時 叫
sa
叫larηy，
a
subsidies , pensions , and payments in kind) in 500-yuan brackets , from under 500 yuan
to 10,000 yuan and ove r.
14. The Pearson correlation of age and education is .41. Age is not statistica lIy
when education is excluded; education achieves significance at tbe .1 0 level
when age is excluded. The lack of statistical significance for control variables nlay reflect
the snla lI er variance on these variables (e.g. , relative to a lnass sample) and not the
inherent irrelevance of age or inconle as predictors of econonlic ideology. In a separate
individual-Ievel regression model of the mass salnple using age , sex, education , and
household incolne Ievel as independent variables and position on the econonlic ideology
dinlension as the dependent variable , age , sex , and incollle are a11 statistica11y signi自 cant
at at least the .05 leve I. When age is taken out of the nlodel , education is statistica lIy
significan t.
slgnl 自 cant

15. Th is is not due to a Iimitation of the data: the nledian position of villagers bas higher
variance than the mean (1. 8, cOlnpared to 1. 2). The Pearson correlation coe 也 cient for
tbe two nleasures is .83.
16. Data on vi11age elections are co lI ected at the township level , by the townsbip
department of civil affairs. Tbe fact that data are lacking on elections in tbe otber 30
vi11ages suggests that the tO\V叫lips (and , for the Inost part , counties) in wbich those
vi11ages are located had not made a serious effort to implelnent the draft law on vi lI age
conlmittees by 1990, when tbe survey was conducted. Dropping 30 obselvations from an
already small sample is obviously not idea I. But it is tenuous to assume , for example , for
the purpose of facilitating analysis , that the 30 vi11ages for which data are lacking are
uniformly cases of "less competitiveness" in the choice of vi11age leaders , compared to
those vi11ages in the sample which we know held semi-competitive elections. More to the
point , such an assumption ultimately serves lit tI e purpose , as the multivariate analyses
of congruence enlploy not only data on electoral competitiveness but also data on voter
turnout (both of which turn out to be statistica11y signi自ca叫.
17. Some large vi11ages have formed representative assemblies (see esp. Lawrence 1994) ,
but this does not solve the problenl described here because a handful of representatives
sometimes do a11 the candidate 的mination and selection (see Zhen and Shi 1990).
18. These figures are for 1988 village population size.
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19. Many Chinese accounts discuss the importance of a strong village collective economy
as a factor in e 釘'ective vi lI age committees. Th is is more likely related to e 旺'e ctive
execution of state assignments rather than congruence (see O'Brien 1994) , but it may
have an indirect e在'e ct on congruence. If so , the e旺'e ct may be captured by the income
variable , as wealthy vi lI ages are usually those \vith strong colI ective economies.
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Table 1. Changes in Rural Administrative Organization , 1978-93

People's
Communes

Production
Brigades

Townships
and Towns

Village
Village
Committees Committee Cadres

1978

52,534
52,781

686 ,666
690 ,000

1979

53 ,229
53 ,348

701 ,288
699 ,000

1980

54 ,183

709 ,820

1981

54 ,368

718 ,022

1982

54 ,352

719 ,438

1983

36 ,268
40 ,079

550 ,484

38 ,482
16 ,252

311 ,681
199 ,657

7,046

92 ,476
91 ,171

927 ,311
926 ,439

1985

91 ,590
91 ,1 38

948 ,628
940 ,617

3 ,795 ,958

1986

72 ,135
71 ,521

866 ,130
847,894

3,658 ,861

1987

69 ,842
68 ,490

845 ,025
830,302

3,598 ,751

1988

56 ,676
56 ,002

882,564
740 ,375

3,665 ,566

1989

56 ,497
55 ,764

934 ,346
746 ,432

3,793 ,816

1990

56 ,481
55 ,838

1,001 ,272
743 ,278

4,094 ,494

1991

55 ,109
55 ,542

1,018 ,593
804 ,153

4,243 ,883

1992

48 ,366
48 ,250

1,004 ,349
806 ,032

4,308 ,878

1993

48 ,200

802,400

Year

1984

63
249

Sources: Ministry of Civil A旺airs ， Bureau of Planning and Financial A証'airs ， ed. , Minzheng
tongji lishi ziliao huibian [Collection of historical statistics on civil a旺airs] (Beijing: n.p. , 1993) ,
4-15; Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1980 [1980 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye
chubanshe , 1981) ，只 Zhongguo nongye ni州的 n 1981 [1981 agricultural yearbook of China]

(Be站ing: Nongye chubanshe , 1982) , 9; Zhongguo nongye n圳的n 1982 [1982 agricultural
yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe , 1983) ，的 Zhongguo nongye n圳的n 1983
[1983 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: No時ye chubanshe , 1984) , 19; Zhongguo
nongye nianjian 1984 [1984 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe ,
1984) , 67; Zhongguo nongye 肌肉jian 1985 [1985 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing:
Nongye chubanshe , 1985) , 121; Zhongguo nongye n圳的n 1986 [1986 agricultural yearbook
of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe , 1986) , 151; Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1987 [1987
agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: No月ye 伽banshe ， 1987) , 196; Zhongguo nongye
nianjian 1988 [1988 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe , 1988) , 213;
Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1989 [1989 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye
chubanshe , 1989) , 240; Zhongguo nongye nianjian 1990 [1990 agricultural yearbook of China]
(Beijing: Nongye chubanshe , 1990) , 246; Zhongguo nongye 1仰'ljian 1991 [1991 agricultural
yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe , 1991) , 278; Zhonggω nongye nianjian 1992
[1 992 agricultural yearbook of China] (B吋ing: Nongye 伽 banshe ， 1992) , 270; Zhongguo
nongye nianjian 1993 [1993 agricultural yearbook of China] (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe ,
1993) , 238; Zhongguo tongji n圳的n 1994 [1994 statistical yearbook of China] (B吋 lng:
Zho時guo tongji chubanshe , 1994) , 17.

Note: As there are large discrepancies between some figures available from the Ministry of
Civil A証airs and those published in other statistical yearbooks , the table presents 制'0 sets of
自gures where available. 1980 and 1982 日 gures and 1983-84 production brigade figures , for
which 1 am unable to find a Ministry of Civil A旺airs source , are from the agricultural
yearbooks noted above; 1981 日gures are the same in both sources; 1993 figures are from the
1994 statistical yearbook noted above. For all other years , figures in the first row are from
the Ministry of Civil Affairs statistical co lI ection , and figures in the second row are from the
agricultural yearbooks. Discrepancies for 1983 and 1984 are neither surprising nor
substantively very importan t: the major administrative changes took place in those years , and
D10St village committees were simply production brigades renamed. Large discrepancies in
figures for vi lI age committees beginning in 1988 may re f1 ect an undercounting of new
committees constituted at the level of the former production teams. Th e Organic Law on
Village Committees , which came into e 旺'e ct in 1988 , stated that village committees were to
be established at that level (although in practice most remained at the level of the former
production brigades). As an integral pa此 of its responsibility to investigate and promote
organizations of political power at the grassroots , the Ministry of Civil A宜airs specifically
collects data on rural administration. It possesses the capacity to be the more reliable source
but also the incentive to present higher numbers of village committees to demonstrate the
importance or success of its e 缸orts.

TabIe 2. Positions on Economic IdeoIogy Dimension

Position

+10
+9
+8
+7
+6
+ 5
+4
+ 3
+2
+ 1
O
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
-9
-10

Masses
(%)

1. 8
1. 9

3.5
5.7
8.7
12.2
10.0
9.4
13.5
7.5
15.0
3.9
2.4
1. 9
0.8
1. 2
0.3
0.1
O
O
0.1
100%
N=721

Vi lI age Le aders
(%)

3.6
O
5.4
5.4
10.7
16.1
16.1
10.7
14 .3
5.4
7.1
3.6
1. 8
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
100%
N=56

Township Le aders
(%)

5.0
2.5
2.5
5.0
2.5
5.0
22.5
10.0
15.0
7.5
12.5
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
100%
N=40

Note: Position values are the responden t' s reported position on the
importance of state enterprises for economic development minus
reported position on the importance of individual enterprises for
economic developmen t.

Table 3. Responsiveness of Village Leaders to Electorates and Selectorates

Independent Variables

Coefficients
Model1
OLS
WLS

Median position of village masses

.39*
(.28)

Mode12
OLS
WLS

.39*
(.28)

Mean position of village masses

.67**
(.3 3)

.67**
(.3 3)

Median/mean position of to\vnship leaders

.38**
(.19)

.38**
(.19)

.39**
(.19)

.39**
(.19)

Village leader's age

.016
(.055)

.016
(.055)

.018
(.053)

.017
(.053)

Village leader's education

.18
(.13)

.18
(.13)

.18
(.13)

.18
(.13)

Village leader's income level

.069
(.14)

.069
(.14)

.084
(.13)

.084
(.13)

Intercept

-31
(108)

-31
(108)

-36
(103)

-35
(104)

.13
1. 6

.16
2.6

.16
1. 6

.13
R2
2.6
Standard error of the regression
Standard errors of coefficients in parentheses
** significant at .05 (one-tailed test)
* significant at .10 (one-tailed test)
N =56 villages

Note: See text for description of variables.

Table 4. Proximity and Centrism of Village Leaders to Their Electorates:
Explaining Inter-Village Variation in Congruence

Coe 自 cients

Independent Variables
Centrism

Proximity 1

Proximi句 2

-55**
(29)

-48*
(33)

-62 村

Interest in viIl age elections

-17*
(12)

-9.4
(13)

-24**
(13)

Voter turnout

.56 t
(.3 3)

.52
(.37)

.60 •
(.3 3)

Attendance at village meetings

.48 汁

. 58 什

(.17)

. .37•
(.19)

Village size

13*
(8.4)

10
(9.4)

15**
(8.5)

Incumbency

-.21
(.30)

-.25
(.34)

-.18
(.30)

Village mean per capita income

-.0038
(.013)

-.0048
(.015)

-.0028
(.013)

Education

-1. 4
(3.7)

-2.4
(4.2)

-.51
(3 .8)

Electoral competitiveness

6.6
(43)

R2
.44
Standard error of the regression
15
Standard errors of coe 伍cients in parentheses
••
signi自 cant at .05 (two-tailed test)
•
significant at .10 (two-tailed test)
** signl 自 cant at .05 (one-tailed test)
* significant at .10 (one-tailed test)
N = 26 villages

Note: See text for description of variables.

(.1 月

1. 9**
(.78)

Variance in mass positions
Intercept

(30)

11
(48)

2.9
(43)

.3 3
16

.51
14

Research Associates , 1994-95

Centre for As ian Pacific Studies

Centre for Public Policy Studies

D r. Bridges , Brian , USL

D r.

D r. Chan , Che Po , UL

Mr. Dixon , John , USL

D r.

Che ，嗎lai

Kin. USL

Che ，而lai

Dr. Fan ,

c.

Kin , USL

Simon , UL

D r. Cheung , Kui Yin , UL

D r. Le e , Keng Mun , William , UL

Dr. Fan , C. Simon , UL

D r. Leung , Kit Fun , Beatrice , UL

M r. Kwok , Hong Kin , UL

D r. Li , Pang Kwong , UL

D r. Le e , Keng Mun , William , UL

M r. Ma , Sai Kwong , UL

D r. Le ung , Kit Fun , Beatrice , UL

D r. Newman , David , USL

Dr. Li , Pang Kwong , UL

D r. Voon , Thomas , UL

M r. Ma , Sai

Kwo月，

UL

D r. Scissors , Derek , UL
Dr. Thomson ,

Elspe曲，

UL

Dr. Voon , Thomas , UL

All the Research Associates listed above are staff of Department of Social Sciences. Interested
staff from other academic departments of the College and other institutions are welcome to join
the Centres as Research Associates. Please contact Dr. Brian Bridges (Te l. 2572 2226 Ext. 381)
for further information.
USL = U凶versity Senior Lecturer
UL = University Lecturer

W orking Paper Series
起盟主

Author

1 (1/93)

Growth into a market economy:
The "Incremental Approach" in China

D r. Fan Gang

2 (2/93)

中國第一部證券法起草中的

厲以學教授

No.

若平問題

3 (3/93)

Social Inequality in Singapore:
A Dual Economy Approach

D r. William K.M. Lee

4 (4/93)

European Monetary Integration:
Experiences and Future Prospects

Prof. Dieter Cassel
and D r. Thon1as Apolte

5 (5/93)

xνhither

Hong Kong in an Open-Door,
Reforn1ing Chinese Econolny?
(Published in The Pacific Review (London)
Vo 1.6 No .4, Dec 1993 , pp.333-351)

Mr. Y. P. Ho
and Prof. Y. Y. Kueh

6 (6/93)

China's Ri se , Russia's Fall:
Policy Choice or System Difference

D r. Peter Nolan

7 (7/93)

ECO l1 01nic Integration Within Greater
China: Trade and Investment Flows
Between Mainland China , Hong Kong
and Taiwan
(Published in The China Ouarterlv No.136 ,
Dec 1993 , pp.711-745)

Dr. Robert F. Ash
and Prof. Y. Y. Kueh

8 (1194)

North Korean Nuclear Weapons Policy:
An Expected Utility Analysis

D r. David Newman
and D r. Brian Bridges

9 (2/94)

Economic Reforms and Inequality
in China

D r. Joseph C. H. Chai
and 孔1s. B. Karin Chai

10 (3/94)

Industrial Deregulation and
Economic Restructuring in China:
A GA TT Perspective

Prof. Y. Y. Kueh

11 (4/94)

The Politiçal Developn1ent of China ,
Taiwan and Hong Kong Since the Late
1970s: Problems and Prospects

M r. Wong Yiu-chung

12 (5/94)

Decreasing Cost and Profit Maximization
in Cournot Duopoly Models

Dr. Lei Kai -cheong

Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese
Enterprise Licensing

D r. Melanie Manion

13

(6月 4)CAPS

14 (7/94)CPPS

Economics as a Conceptual Resource for
the Study of Public Management

Prof. Daivd L. Weimer
and Prof. Aidan R. Vinin

15 (8/94)CAPS

The Fifth Dragon: Aspects of the Economic
Take-off in Guangdong Province , China

Pro f. Y.Y. Kueh

16 (1/ 95)CAPS

Kim Jong-il and the Future of North Korea

Dr. Brian Bridges

17 (2/95)CPPS

Mandatory Occupational Retirement Savings:
T owards a Program Design Agenda for
Hong Kong

M r. John Dixon

Ideological Congruence in the Chinese
Countryside: Vi l1 age Leaders and their
Electorates and Selectorates

D r. Melanie Manion

18

(3 月 5)CAPS

Lingnan College Library
Date Due 到期單
All books on Joan 役l'!; 吭，片 ~ ~~~， '
te recall afteI 2 weeks

~ r~) DEC 1999
t

.‘' ‘

•••

日刷刷刷刷叫
7，

晰州彷

m叫
m叫MMMnu

，心淵明順7順，

HHHHHHHHHH4

用
4
，.

J

U叫U叫Uqu

岫叫兩M
岫M叫咱間明4.E

州州州州。

M間-EE--EEEE
叫EMM
圳川川仙川川圳U
圳U
川H
們
RM

A 圳圳川川川叫「

i

治州州岫州州
qu

aLHHHH
WMI!a
叫H
'，1
』
扒
』EEE-'t
目E
，
El
l

•••

no
自州州州州
NHHHHHHHHH

